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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a heated debate among developed and developing
countries concerning the harmonization of pharmaceutical patent laws'
since the drafting of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS").2 Some developing countries argue
that bringing their domestic patent protection laws in line with patent law
regimes in the developed world would cause necessary medicines to
become too expensive for most citizens to afford.3  Some developed
countries, however, argue that uniform world intellectual property laws are
essential for the promotion of free and balanced trade and the maintenance
of a healthy economy.4 They also argue that without intellectual property
protection in the developing world, the drugs necessary to treat tropical
diseases would never be developed in the first place.
In response to the assertions of the developed countries concerning a
strong international intellectual property regime, some developing
countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, advocate the use of
* JD Candidate, 2005, Northwestern University School of Law. The author wishes to
express her gratitude to her editors and her parents for their support in this endeavor.
1 Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIs. INT'L L.J. 481,
514 (2002) [hereinafter Sell 2002 Article #1].
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
3 Sell 2002 Article #1, supra note 1, at 515.
4 Michelle M. Nerozzi, Note: The Battle Over Life-Saving Pharmaceuticals: Are
Developing Countries being "TRIPped" by Developed Countries?, 47 VILL. L. REv. 605,615
(2002).
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compulsory licensing to ensure an adequate drug supply during epidemics
and other periods of national emergency.5 When a government issues a
compulsory license, it allows use or manufacture of a patented invention
without the patent-holder's permission.6 Such a license would then enable
the residents of that particular country to obtain drugs at prices lower than
the pharmaceutical company charges elsewhere.7
Indeed, during the drafting of TRIPS, one of the concessions the
developed countries made was to leave open the possibility of using
compulsory licenses, embodied in Article 3 1.8 While Article 31 does not
specifically allude to compulsory licensing, it does detail the circumstances
in which a user may not have to grant a patent-holder all of the rights to
which he would ordinarily be entitled under TRIPS. 9 One scholar believes
that compulsory licensing is the solution to the problem posed by high drug
prices in developing countries and has argued for its expansion.' As a
result of pressure from the developing world, the criteria for issuing a
compulsory license were clarified and expanded in the 2001 Doha
Declaration'" and again at a 2003 TRIPS Council meeting held prior to the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") ministerial meeting.
For the first time in 2003, the TRIPS Council agreed to allow
developing countries to import drugs made under compulsory license in the
form of a waiver of TRIPS Article 31(f). 13 Prior to this, both TRIPS and
5 Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic
Considerations, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 563, 571 (2002).
6 Nabila Ansari, International Patent Rights in a Post-Doha World, 11 CURRENTS: INT'L
TRADE L.J. 57, 62 (2002).
7 Id. at 63.
8 DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 159 (1st
ed. 1998).
9 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 31. Article 31 is reproduced in the appendix at
the end of this comment.
10 Amoldo Lacayo, Comment: Seeking a Balance: International Pharmaceutical Patent
Protection, Public Health Crises, and the Emerging Threat of Bio-Terrorism, 33 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REv. 295,297 (2002).
"1 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Adopted on 14 November
2001, WT/MIN(01)DEC/2 [hereinafter Doha Declaration], at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/min0 I/DEC2.doc (Nov. 20, 2001).
12 Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, Decision of 30 August 2003, WT/L/540, [hereinafter Implementation
Decision], http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/540.doc (Sept. 2, 2003). The
waiver embodied in the decision is to only be in effect until an amendment to the TRIPS
Agreement is completed, with a scheduled date of the end of June 2004. Id. See also
Jennifer May Rogers, Note, The TRIPS Council's Solution to the Paragraph 6 Problem:
Toward Compulsory Licensing Viability for Developing Countries, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 443 (2004).
13 Implementation Decision, at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/tiWT/L/
540.doc (Sept. 2, 2003).
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Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 4 prohibited this practice, which
rendered compulsory licensing rights useless for countries with no
manufacturing capacity of their own.' 5 This comment examines this
increasingly permissive use of international trading policies regarding the
use of compulsory licensing. I argue that such a large expansion of
licensing power dilutes the original purposes for which TRIPS was drafted
and that there may be other mechanisms for protecting public health in the
developing world that do not compromise intellectual property protection.
Part II of this comment tracks the history of Article 31 and other
relevant articles of TRIPS, as well as their changing status after Doha and
particularly after the latest agreement made in August 2003. More
specifically, I will discuss the 2003 TRIPS Council interpretive
agreement-the clarification of the Doha Declaration-in great detail since
this has only been sparingly done in two law journal articles thus far 16 due
to its recent passage. Part III compares the original intent of TRIPS with
the current state of compulsory licensing usage and makes the argument
that the two are not in sync. Part IV suggests several solutions that will
allow patent protection to remain unharmed in the developing world but
will still help to alleviate the international public health crisis. These
suggestions include: voluntary medicine donation programs, voluntary price
discrimination plans, pooled procurement procedures, and public-funded
developments. Finally, I propose a unique solution consisting of a
worldwide Orphan Drug Program combined with price discrimination,
similar to that in effect in the United States.
II. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF COMPULSORY
LICENSING
A. Pertinent Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement
The TRIPS agreement came into force in 1994 as a means of
harmonizing widely divergent world intellectual property laws.1 7 There are
14 Doha Declaration, supra note 11, para. 6 reads:
We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing
under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious
solution to this problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.
15 Lacayo, supra note 10, at 300.
16 Amir Attaran, Assessing and Answering Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: The Case for Greater Flexibility and a Non-
Justiciability Solution, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 743 (2003) [hereinafter Attaran 2003
Article]. See also Rogers, supra note 12.
17 See Understanding the WTO: The Agreements: Intellectual Property: Protection and
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several TRIPS Articles pertinent to the intellectual property and public
health debates which have led some developing countries to call for
compulsory licensing. First, Article 27(2) recognizes the conflict between
intellectual property and public health when it ambiguously states that a
patent is not required for an invention, product, or process which is
necessary to protect public health. 18 While it has been argued that under
this Article such medicines as AIDS drugs should not be subject to TRIPS
at all since these products are necessary to protect public health, rejoinders
have been voiced arguing that 27(2) simply means that dangerous products
should be excluded from patentability.'
9
More importantly, TRIPS Article 31 implicitly provides for
compulsory licensing. 20 As mentioned above, it is interesting to note that
the text of TRIPS itself never actually refers to "compulsory licensing" per
se.2 1 Rather, it is possible to infer a provision for such licensing when it is
read in conjunction with the earlier intellectual property agreements on
which TRIPS was based.22 A compulsory license allows a government to
manufacture a product without the patent holder's permission. The sub-
sections of Article 31 further clarify the conditions under which such a
license can be granted. First, manufacturing can only begin once the
government seeking the compulsory license has made reasonable efforts to
get the permission of the patent owner.23 Article 31(b), however, waives
this provision in cases of "national emergency., 24 In addition, export of
Enforcement [hereinafter TRIPS Explanation], at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/
whatise/tife/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
18 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 27(2). The text of this article reads:
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of
the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordrepublic or morality,
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is
prohibited by their law.
Article 27(2) has so far not constituted a major element of the international intellectual
property/world heath debate, but it is possible that developing countries could try to exploit
its potential if the amendment to TRIPS envisioned by the 2003 Implementation Decision
does not lead to desirable results.
19 Amir Attaran, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options under WTO Law, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 859, 871 (2002) [hereinafter Attaran 2002 Article].
20 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 31.
21 id.
22 Sara Ford, Comment, Compulsory Licensing Under the TRIPS Agreement: Balancing
Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 941,953 (2000).
23 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 31(b).
24 Id.
The Spirit of TRIPS
25:257 (2004)
compulsorily licensed products is forbidden.25 Finally, the patent holder
must be adequately compensated.26
After the process of implementation for TRIPS began, the two Articles
mentioned above led to confusion and even some international disputes.27
For example, when South Africa amended its constitution to include
provisions for compulsory licensing, a large number of drug companies in
developed countries filed suit, arguing that Article 31 of TRIPS does not
actually allow for compulsory licensing to be included in domestic
legislation. While the suits were ultimately dropped after international
outcry in support of a remedy for the public health crisis, the confusion still
remained.28
B. The Doha Declaration
In order to remedy the confusion that was produced by the tension
between Article 27, which allows exclusion from patentability due to public
health concerns, and Article 31, which implicitly provides for compulsory
licensing, delegates made it a point to put clarification of some of the more
contentious aspects of TRIPS on the agenda for the 2001 WTO meeting in
Doha, Qatar.2 While the resulting Declaration is merely an interpretative
statement issued by the WTO and thus does not actually change any of the
legal provisions of TRIPS, it is regarded as persuasive authority to be used
in the event of a trade dispute. 30 The international pharmaceutical industry,
including lobbyists on behalf of the Pharmaceutical Researchers and
Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA"), believes that the resulting Doha
Declaration made too many concessions to developing countries and
undermined the original policy rationales underlying TRIPS. 31 On the other
25 Id. at art. 31 (f).
26 Id. at art. 31 (h).
27 Aditi Bagchi, Compulsory Licensing and the Duty of Good Faith in TRIPS, 55 STAN.
L. REv. 1529, 1530 (2003).
28 Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha
"Solution," 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 47, 53 (2002). The public outcry concerning the South African
suit resulted from increasingly bad publicity of American pharmaceutical companies and
consciousness-raising actions of a number of non-governmental organizations. The
companies bringing suit were eventually forced to give in.
29 Id. at 55.
30 TRIPS Explanation, supra note 17.
31 See Peter N. Fowler & Alice T. Zalik, A U.S. Government Perspective Concerning the
Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property: Past, Present and Near
Future, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 401 (2003). With regards to the purpose of
TRIPS and its importance for U.S. policy, the authors write that, "[t]he TRIPS Agreement
ensures that our national creativity and innovation are as protected abroad as they are at
home, and perhaps even more importantly, that other nations are encouraged to develop their
own national spirit and economy based on creativity and innovation." Id. at 402. See also
Attaran 2002 Article, supra note 19.
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hand, some world leaders and lobbying groups, including Action Aid,
Doctors Without Borders, and Oxfam, argued that the Declaration provided
just the right balance of maintaining the integrity of international
intellectual property while allowing developing countries to make
exceptions for clear public health reasons.32
The Doha Declaration specifically recognizes that Article 31 grants
national governments the power to issue compulsory licenses and to take
action in situations in which they believe public health concerns outweigh
the urgency of international intellectual property protection. 33  The
Declaration also further clarifies 31(b), which sets out parameters for the
use of compulsory licensing, stating that developing countries have
discretion in determining what constitutes a national emergency. 34 The
Declaration itself states that epidemics such as AIDS and malaria would
indeed be adequate grounds to declare a national emergency.
35
However, Paragraph 6 of the Declaration contains a problem that was
unresolved even after Doha. TRIPS Article 31 specifically states that
medicines under compulsory license cannot be exported outside of the36
country that issued the license. Paragraph 6 of the Declaration recognizes
that this element of the Agreement cannot be changed by interpretative
statement. It also acknowledges that prohibiting the importation of drugs
made under compulsory license means countries with no manufacturing
capacity cannot take advantage of this method of obtaining access to
medicines. In order to rectify this problem, it set a deadline for the end of
2002 for the delegates to meet and resolve this particular issue.38 While the
WTO delegates failed to meet the deadline, they did convene prior to the
September 2003 WTO meeting in Cancun. 39 There they issued a statement
outlining a compromise regarding the problems in Paragraph 6 of the
Declaration.4°
C. The TRIPS Council Agreement
This Agreement temporarily waives the provision of Article 31(f)
32 See Sara DeForge, Comment, A Tough Pill to Swallow: The United States' Passive
Efforts in Curtailing Intellectual Property Rights in Favor of Humanity, 4 LOY. L. & TECH.
ANN. 75, 79 (2004). See generally Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension
Between Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property, 14 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 193 (2002) [hereinafter Sell 2002 Article #2].
33 Doha Declaration, supra note 11.
34 id.
35 id.
36 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3 1(b).
37 Doha Declaration, supra note 11, 6.
38 id.
39 TRIPS Explanation, supra note 17.
40 Implementation Decision, supra note 12.
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which prohibits the export of compulsory licensed products outside of the
domestic market.4' This waiver is scheduled to last until member
governments choose to amend TRIPS Article 31 (f).42 Thus, under the terms
of the Agreement, countries can now export medicines made under
compulsory license to other countries that need them, subject to certain
conditions. 3 First, the Agreement defines an "eligible importing member"
as a least-developed country that first notifies the TRIPS Council of its
intent to import medicines made under compulsory license only in a
"limited" way.44 Acceptable means of importation would be for use only in
"situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency," the exact meaning of which seems unclear.45 The Agreement
therefore is structured to ensure that a country will not import products
made under compulsory license merely to avoid high pharmaceutical prices
in its domestic market.
Paragraph 2 of the Agreement specifies what information a potential
importing country must produce in order to meet the legal standards of
TRIPS.4 The country must state the name and the expected quantity of the
drug it wishes to import.47 It must then present evidence to the TRIPS
Council that it does not currently have the manufacturing capacity to
produce the medicine on its own without having to resort to importing it
from elsewhere. 48 Finally, the importing country must promise that the
compulsory license it grants for the drug is in compliance with Article 31 of
TRIPS.49
Exporting countries are also subject to a number of conditions under
the Agreement. They are required to limit the amount of the drug they
export to the importing country and must clearly identify the medicine
earmarked for export with special labeling or special colors and shapes for
the product itself.50  This provision helps to prevent "grey market"
importation of pharmaceuticals into markets other than the one originally
intended by allowing consumers and distributors to differentiate from
quantities of the drug being sold in that market legally. Finally, in another
effort designed to combat the grey market problem, exporting countries
must publicize on the internet the names and quantities of medicines they
41 id
42 Id.
43 Attaran 2003 Article, supra note 16, at 765.




41 Id. at 2(a)(i).
41 Id. at 2(a)(ii).
41 Id. at 2(a)(iii).
50 Implementation Decision, supra note 12, at T 2(b)(i)-(ii).
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have exported under compulsory license.5'
The Agreement also contains a number of other provisions designed to
ensure that importation of medicines manufactured under compulsory
license is not undertaken capriciously. Paragraph 3 calls for adequate
remuneration to the exporting country by the importing one "taking into
account the economic value to the importing Member of the use that has
been authorized in the exporting Member."5 This requirement guarantees
that each potential importing country takes some kind of economic
responsibility for its incursion into the international intellectual property
regime.
More importantly, Paragraph 4 requires importing countries to take
"reasonable measures" according to their individual administrative
capacities to make sure that medicines that are imported into their borders
are not re-exported to wealthier countries. 3 This Paragraph also calls for
developed countries to fill in the financial and administrative gaps to ensure
parallel importation of imported drug products doesn't become too much of
a problem. Similarly, Paragraph 5 requires all WTO Members to provide
legal means to guarantee that products which have crept over their borders
through parallel importation are not sold domestically.
Finally, the Agreement contains a number of forward-thinking
provisions aimed at eliminating the need to import products made under
compulsory license in the future. Paragraph 7 generally exhorts members
to encourage the transfer of needed technology across the borders of LDCs
so that in the future they will have the capacity to produce the medicines
they need for themselves.56  Paragraphs 8-11 discuss annual reporting
procedures and contemplate a TRIPS Council meeting by the end of 2003
to suggest a more permanent solution to the problem of compulsory
licensing.
57
The discussion of the various provisions of the Agreement above
reveals the detail in which the WTO delegates attempted to solve the
problems of Paragraph six of the Doha Declaration prior to Cancun. Part
III below asserts that despite all this careful detail, the Agreement fails on a
number of counts to meet the concerns of industry in the developed world,







56 Implementation Decision, supra note 12, at 7.
" Id 8-11.
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III. THE INCONSISTENCEY BETWEEN THE TRIPS COUNCIL
DECISION AND THE ORIGINAL PURPOSES OF TRIPS
A. Criticisms of the Agreement
The first article to present in-depth criticism of the 2003 Agreement
was written by Amir Attaran, an immunologist and lawyer.58 His major
argument is that it will be ineffective at promoting public health in the least-
developed countries because countries so rarely issue compulsory licenses
under any circumstances. Attaran reasons that this implies that compulsory
licensing is simply not practical, and a developing country would not utilize
it even if such use were legally available.59 While Attaran finds reliance on
compulsory licensing an ineffective and inappropriate method of improving
public health in the developing world, this particular article presents several
suggestions on how to ameliorate this latest effort at a compromise on
international intellectual property. I shall incorporate these suggestions
when I assess whether the Agreement, either as it stands or in Attaran's
iteration, adheres to the original purposes of TRIPS.60
Attaran first asserts that the ability to import drugs made under
compulsory license may not be as valuable as anti-globalization activists
believe it is, simply because of the rarity with which licenses have been
issued in the years since the TRIPS Agreement was signed.61 For example,
Canada stopped issuing compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals in the
early 1990s and there have been no compulsory licenses issued since that
time.62 If governments have been so reluctant to issue compulsory licenses
to alleviate public health crises within their own borders, they will surely
not take the drastic political step of issuing a license to help the citizens of a
63foreign country.
Many developing countries wish to respect the international patent
system as it currently stands in order to attract new investment and
technology into their economies. 64  Indeed, the "velvet handcuffs of
international custom and comity are [so] strong" as to prevent any action by
58 Attaran 2003 Article, supra note 16.
59 Id. at 747. Indeed, Attaran perceives the entire debate on compulsory licensing to be
somewhat puzzling: "The total absence of pharmaceutical compulsory licenses is all the
more striking when one recalls the lobbying of anti-globalization activists, whose primary
goal is not public health, but compulsory licensing per se." Id. In addition, he points out
that pharmaceutical companies need not fear the empty threat of compulsory licensing.
60 See infra Part III.C.
61 Attaran 2003 Article, supra note 16, at 747.
62 Id. at 747 n.7.
63 Id. at 748.
64 Id. at 750.
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these developing countries that may alienate potential investors.65  Thus,
while the provisions of the Agreement may "stretch" Article 31 far beyond
the original limits foreseen by its drafters, it actually may not matter if no
country ever resorts to the exportation of compulsory licensed medicine.
Second, Attaran criticizes the temporary nature of the 2003
Agreement.66  He objects to the fact that the TRIPS Council is now
beholden to yet another set of negotiations by the end of 2003, increasing
the potential for inefficiency. As it was, delegates failed to meet their
deadline to clarify Paragraph six of the Doha Declaration, and came to a
striking impasse regarding the protection of public health during the
negotiations rounds at Doha.67 This inability to negotiate in an effective
and timely manner will lead to uncertainty about the permanent status of
TRIPS Article 3 l(f). If WTO delegates fail to permanently amend Article
31 and continue to advise the world that the Agreement is only a temporary
solution, a country wishing to import a medicine made under compulsory
licensing may not know whether such an action will be considered legal in
the future.
Third, Attaran proposes a number of changes to the text that he claims
will lend it much-needed clarity if compulsory licensing is indeed the policy
the WTO adopts in promoting public health in the developing countries.
In order to establish certainty, the author would retool the definition of
"eligible importing member., 69  He suggests an alternative based on a
default rule which declares any country below a certain level of income
should be deemed to have no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity of its
own.70 This rule is more inclusive than the current definition, which only
allows the "least developing countries" to be eligible importing members. 71
Such a change would ensure that countries like CMte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and
others which are better off relative to those countries typically considered
"least developed," such as Botswana and Sierra Leone, but with no
65 Id.
66 Id. at 767. Attaran had also balked at the idea that Paragraph six of the Doha
Declaration could even be limited at all: there is nothing in Paragraph six which ever
expressly allows for the Doha Declaration to only be limited to specific diseases. Indeed,
this is a potential reason why the Implementation Decision could be considered illegal per
se. Id. at 752.
67 Attaran 2003 Article, supra note 16, at 768. "Far from putting the current debate to
rest, Paragraph 11 of the Motta Text mandates a new set of negotiations to amend the TRIPS
Agreement, and despite suggesting a mid-2004 deadline to negotiate and adopt that
amendment, past WTO history teaches that it will take much longer." Id. (citation omitted)
68 Id. at 766. The author, however, more fully believes that non-justiciability is a better
alternative to the public health access crisis than endeavoring to perfect any kind of solution
related to compulsory licensing. Id. at 770.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 760-61.
71 Implementation Decision, supra note 12, 1 l(b).
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cognizable manufacturing capacities, would still be able to take advantage
of compulsory licensing.
Attaran further suggests that his default rule should be extended such
that any country with a certain percentage of its population infected with the
HIV virus or which faced a bioterrorism disaster could be treated as if it had
insufficient manufacturing capacity.73  Countries besieged by major
epidemics would thus be entitled to import medicines made under
compulsory license even if they have manufacturing capacity, simply if
they need some outside "help" to supplement their domestic pharmaceutical
supplies. This rule would give the definition of "eligible importing
member" the flexibility it needs to function in emergency situations,
regardless of the requesting importing country's manufacturing status.
Unfortunately, Attaran's proposed modifications to the Text do very
little to bring the concept of compulsory licensing closer to the original
purposes of TRIPS. His rules for determining when a potential importer
can be considered an "eligible importing member" only encourage the
developing world's reliance on outside assistance when the WTO should
instead be encouraging domestic technological development. His first rule
in particular promotes the opposite type of incentive. If a country below a
certain level of income was deemed to have "no manufacturing capacity,
74
those countries that do have the technology to become self-sufficient would
be less inclined to utilize and develop this already existing technology.
Thus, there is no effective way to reconcile the permissive importation of
products made under compulsory license-even with Attaran's proposed
changes-that reconciles them with the original TRIPS purpose of
technology transfer.
While Attaran's suggestions for clarifying the scope of the Agreement
are helpful, his analysis would benefit from an exploration of whether the
Agreement is true to the original purposes of TRIPS. Thus, to supplement
the analysis of Attaran's article above, the discussion below compares the
Agreement with the purposes of TRIPS, asserts that they are not in sync,
and then goes on to propose solutions to the access problem that do not as
heavily infringe upon international intellectual property protection.
B. The Purposes of TRIPS
Many authors agree that WTO delegates initially drafted the TRIPS
Agreement in order to promote the increased research and development
investment that occurs as a result of strong worldwide patent protection.75
72 Attaran 2003 Article, supra note 16, at 761.
71 Id. at 763.
14 Id. at 766.
75 Sykes, supra note 28, at 49.
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Taking the pharmaceutical industry as an example, a company has very
little incentive to invest the millions of dollars it takes to bring a product to
market if generic companies might undercut its pricing structures upon the
exportation of a medicine to a foreign country.76 Incentives to develop
drugs to treat afflictions abroad, such as tropical diseases, would be
particularly low.
77
TRIPS also sought to achieve a number of other goals that were
designed to promote industry in the developed world. At the top of this list
was the maintenance of a healthy world trading system. 78 Indeed, Nabila
Ansari asserts that the "fair and economic conduct of international trade is
dependent on secure intellectual property rights.,
79
Poor international intellectual property protection has been analogized
to trade barriers, such as tariffs .8  Such other types of intellectual property
protection ensure that artists and inventors remain within their own
countries where they can receive sufficient remuneration for their work.81
Furthermore, trade barriers limit technological growth and development in
the developing world because they discourage investment. Similarly, a lack
of intellectual property protection creates the same detrimental result that a
trade barrier does for the less industrialized country. Inadequate patent
protection will diminish the incentives for research and development of
certain tropical diseases.82 In this context, therefore, intellectual property
protection for some ultimately benefits all.
However, the drafters of the TRIPS Agreement recognized the
importance of providing access to medicines in the era before full
international intellectual property protections were available.83 Indeed, one
author argues that TRIPS "attempts to strike a delicate balance between the
short-term objective of providing access to existing medicines and the long-
term objective of developing new medicines through incentives for future
Research and Development. 84 The TRIPS Council, a group of delegates
assigned by the WTO to oversee the provisions of TRIPS, also recognized
the need for "maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws
76 See SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS Ch. 6 (2003).
77 CARLOS M. CORREA & ABDULQAWI A. YUSUF, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 10-15 (1998).
78 TRIPS Explanation, supra note 17.
79 Ansari, supra note 6, at 58.
80 Id. at 59.
81 Id.
82 Anasari, supra note 6, at 58.
83 Lacayo, supra note 10, at 312.
84 Grace K. Avedissian, Notes and Comments: Global Implications of a Potential U.S.
Policy Shift Toward Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of "Super-
Terrorism, " 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 237,251 (2002).
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and regulations in order to enable [the developing countries] to create a
sound and viable technological base., 85  Thus, not only was TRIPS
designed to ensure that developing countries would be able to utilize the
medicines needed to combat public health crises, it also asserted the goal of
building technology in the least developed countries so that they would not
have to resort to methods such as compulsory licensing in the future.
A number of TRIPS articles acknowledge the plight of people in need
of access to medications, but as I argue below, these articles also embody
solutions to the pharmaceutical access problem. Technology building
provisions and other remedies for national health emergencies in the
Agreement seek to promote international intellectual property rights rather
than degrade them.8 6  Article 7, for example, calls for international
intellectual property protection to be instituted "in a manner conducive to
social and economic welfare., 87 Once again, this "social and economic
welfare" may consist of much more than simply allowing a country to
import medicines made under compulsory license whenever it has a public
health emergency.
Similarly, subsection b of Article 8(1) calls for national legislatures to
"promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development." 88 While representatives of the
developing countries have argued that this Article implies that the WTO
should allow exceptions to strict patent enforcement in the developing
world,89 representatives of industrialized countries believe that it means all
countries should strive to protect patents within their borders in order to
maximize the transfer of needed technology. 90 In fact, the essential purpose
of TRIPS is to build technological investment-both in the developed and
the developing world-through uniform adherence to patent protection.
91
C. The Objectives of the Motta Agreement do not Match the Purposes of
TRIPS
Motta's modification of the Doha Declaration will fail on several
counts to bolster pharmaceutical research and development capacity in the
least developed countries.
First, compulsory licensing alone represents a significant deviation
from the goal of patent protection because it allows the privileges that an
inventor worked diligently to obtain to be undermined without his or her
85 CORREA & YusuF, supra note 77, at 11.
86 Id. at 12.
87 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 7.
88 Id. at art. 8(1).
89 Sell 2002 Article #1, supra note 1, at 516.
90 Lacayo, supra note 10, at 298.
91 Ansari, supra note 6, at 60.
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consent. If the goal of patent protection is to provide for the transfer of
technological investment, the existing public health crises in least
developed countries will inevitably worsen.
The disjuncture between the purposes of TRIPS and importation of
drugs made under compulsory license becomes even more obvious after an
examination of the language comprising the TRIPS Agreement. For
example, Article 7, which lays out TRIPS' objectives, calls for patent
protection to be imlemented through means "conducive to social and
economic welfare."' '  Nabila Ansari argues, "countries that fail to
implement [intellectual property] protection for the innovations from
human capital will be left behind in their development., 94 Thus, the Motta
Agreement's "solution" of broadening the Article 31 compulsory licensing
exception may instead encourage further dependence by least developed
countries on outside assistance to combat public health crises within their
borders.
International intellectual property protection benefits the developing
world in a number of ways that are more consistent with the original
purposes of TRIPS, of promoting world technological development through
strong intellectual property protection, than the compulsory licensing
exception to Article 31. 5 First, pharmaceutical companies require adequate
incentives to undertake research and development for certain tropical
diseases that only affect individuals in the developing world.96  Unlike
medicines that already exist to treat diseases in countries that provide strong
patent protection, research and development will never begin for medicines
that treat tropical diseases because companies know that they will not
receive adequate remuneration for their work in the countries to which they
would sell these products.97 Indeed, the first step in combating a public
health crisis is to ensure that the essential medicines exist before the pricing
98of such drugs even becomes an issue. Some authors in favor of
compulsory licensing seem to forget that without intellectual property
protection there would be no medicine there at all for the country to
license.
99
Further, strong international intellectual property protection can help to
combat the "brain drain" of engineers and inventors out of the least
developed countries. The exodus of trained professionals is quickened by
92 Maskus, supra note 5, at 572.
93 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 7.
94 Ansari, supra note 6, at 58.
95 Id.
96 Maskus, supra note 5, at 568.
97 Ansari, supra note 6, at 60.
98 Maskus, supra note 5, at 568.
99 See generally Sell 2002 Article #1, supra note 1.
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inadequate protections that undermine financial reward to innovators.
00
Similarly, a lack of intellectual property protection causes research
firms from the developed countries to leave the market just when their
innovation is required the most. 10 1
In addition, industry will be less likely to invest in the LDCs when the
"piracy" that results from a loss of patent protection causes a loss in profits
and resulting shareholder dissatisfaction. 2
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO COMPULSORY LICENSING AND A
UNIQUE SOLUTION
In light of the inevitable failure of imported medicine made under
compulsory licensing as a long-term solution to public health crises in the
developing world, one must begin to explore alternatives that do not have
the deleterious effect of anti-patent measures. The alternatives suggested in
some of the literature have become even more relevant as the prohibition on
importation embodied in TRIPS Article 31 has been lifted. As mentioned
above, if a poverty-stricken country with neither pharmaceutical
manufacturing capacity nor an adequate infrastructure to distribute health
care to its population can rely on imports of compulsory licensed drugs, it
will lack the incentives to promote technological growth of its own.10 3 The
alternatives in the literature avoid these types of disincentives.
A. Price Discrimination
Price discrimination is the process of varying the price charged for a
product based on the country in which it is sold. Under such an
arrangement, the price is keyed to what the citizens in each of the countries
can afford. 104 Setting the price depends upon the local elasticity of demand,
or the level to which the price can be raised without driving consumers out
of the market.'0 5  Under a price discrimination regime, pharmaceutical
companies can maintain their price and profit structures in wealthy
countries while allowing the developing world access to needed
medicines. 10 6 However, one hazard of a price discrimination plan is parallel
importation, the "grey market" problem. 0 7 Parallel importation occurs
when medicines sold at lower prices in less developed countries find their
100 Ansari, supra note 6, at 58.
101 Id.
102 Ansari, supra note 6, at 59.
103 Lacayo, supra note 10, at 301.
104 Maskus, supra note 5, at 569.
105 Sykes, supra note 28, at 63.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 64.
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way back into the stream of commerce in wealthier countries and are sold
there at lower-than-market prices. 1
08
While this form of illegal activity may be difficult to curb completely,
the Motta Agreement's provisions for stemming parallel importation of
products made under compulsory license'0 9 may present a viable solution.
As previously discussed above, Paragraph 5 of the Motta Agreement calls
for drug products earmarked for export to other countries under compulsory
license to be shaped and colored differently than their counterparts used for
sale in the domestic market. 11° While it may result in extra expense,
pharmaceutical companies would perhaps engage in this type of
differentiation when pursuing in voluntary price discrimination schemes.
Alternatively, governments of wealthy countries could provide incentives to
domestic industry to help ensure access to medicines in the developing
world through price discrimination by funding the necessary changes to the
appearance of the drugs as to avoid the parallel importation problem.
Under a system of price discrimination, pharmaceutical companies
would maintain the freedom to license their products if and to whom they
wish. They can still maintain their profit margins in industrialized countries
where patients can afford to pay full price for their products. At the same
time, in developing countries they can charge only what an economic
analysis suggests citizens can afford. The other solutions mentioned below
give the companies less control over pricing. Most importantly, under a
price discrimination scheme the company would maintain full control over
the patent they have spent millions of dollars in research and development
costs to secure.
B. Voluntary Donation Schemes
Another method of securing access to medicines in the developing
world is to encourage companies in wealthier countries to voluntarily
donate surplus supplies of certain drugs."' Such a scheme would be based
on the altruism of the wealthier countries, rather than the forced submission
to compulsory licensing envisioned by the Doha Declaration and the
Agreement. A company voluntarily undertaking a drug donation plan
would generate favorable publicity, perhaps increasing shareholder
investment and sales. This in turn would cause other companies to follow
its example. Governments could encourage voluntary donation schemes by
providing tax incentives for companies willing to participate.' 
2
Critics of voluntary donation launch three primary attacks against the
108 Nerozzi, supra note 4, at 618.
109 See Implementation Decision, supra note 12, at 5.
110 Id.
111 Maskus, supra note 5, at 573.
112 id.
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plan. Susan Sell notes that such solutions are merely pretexts for
companies who do not wish to be subjected to diminished patent protection
through compulsory licensing.1 13 In addition, relying on voluntary drug
donations risks large fluctuations in supply: a company would probably
suspend donations if it encountered a drop in profits. 1 4 Furthermore, the
simple donation of drugs in times of national emergency would not further
the TRIPS purpose of promoting technology transfer to the developing
world.
Still, drug donation (and voluntary price reductions in the case of India
to help serve that country's particularly large population) remains a popular
current method of managing drug supplies to fight AIDS in countries such
as Haiti and India.1 5 Indeed, both the Haitian and Indian cases serve as
examples of efforts to ensure an adequate supply of essential medicines
through methods other than diminished intellectual property protection.
C. Bulk Procurement Programs
Bulk procurement occurs when a group of developing countries pool
their collective resources to obtain large quantities of needed drugs to help
treat their populations in situations of national emergency.1 6  Non-
governmental organizations, such as Doctors Without Borders, have also
undertaken such schemes on a charitable basis.' 17 These organizations
advocate that "global procurement guarantees high demand, reliable
payment, and straightforward negotiation of lower prices. '1 8  These
advantages could make pooled procurement and bulk purchasing superior to
voluntary donations if it means more consistent and reliable drug delivery
that is not contingent upon a company's current profit situation. The high
demand could also be advantageous to drug companies who typically do not
expect to reap a very large profit in the developing world.
Pooled procurement also confers benefits beyond those of compulsory
licensing because it requires regional blocs of countries to work together to
solve a common problem, rather than negotiate individually with a distant
exporter. This format would even out the differential in bargaining power
between wealthy producer countries and the least developed countries.
113 Sell 2002 Article #1, supra note 1, at 516.
114 Maskus, supra note 5, at 573.
115 See Celia W. Dugger, In the Vanguard Fighting AIDS, an Army of Haitian Villagers,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 2003, available at http://www.wehaitians.com/november/o202003%
20health% 20news%20this%20month.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2003); Amy Waldman,
India Announces Plans to Expand AIDS Therapy Programs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 2003,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/30/intemational/asia/3OCND-INDI.html?
ex=1 101099600&en=643cb4a6145239fO&ei=5070&tntemail0.
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Following a national or regional health emergency, such a collective
regional effort could lead to domestic technology investment and future
beneficial patent protection as envisioned by TRIPS.
Critics of pooled procurement and bulk purchasing schemes focus on
several shortcomings.'"9 The least developed countries may not be able to
afford needed drugs even on a collective regional basis. The drugs obtained
through bulk purchasing may be lower in quality, and the least-developed
countries may lack the collective bargaining power to negotiate adequate
prices for themselves.120
As a solution, author Keith Maskus calls for the formation of a "global
purchase fund" funded by wealthier countries to decrease transactions costs
and reduce collective action problems.12 ' Like voluntary donation
problems, this type of fund would function from the altruism and the desire
for good publicity of governments and pharmaceutical companies in the
developed world. Like the other alternatives mentioned above, these
motivations are superior to compulsory licensing, which provides
disincentives for development negotiations with countries that may later
undermine profits by issuing a compulsory license.
D. Publicly Funded Research and Development
One scholar argues that publicly funded research will lead to greater
availability of medical supplies to treat tropical diseases which are
otherwise neglected by pharmaceutical companies in the developed
world. 122  As an example, Maskus credits publicly funded agricultural
research with improving nutrition in certain developing countries.123 Using
this model, governments of countries in the industrialized world could
provide more funding for both universities and for-profit research
institutions to study tropical diseases. However, a problem with publicly-
funded research is that voters may not wish to see their tax dollars being
spent on research for diseases that do not exist domestically. As a potential
solution, Maskus calls for research donations to come from multinational
organizations and NGOs, which are not accountable to voters, to
supplement government funding. 24 This solution is unlikely to work well,
however, since most NGO's do not have adequate capital to fund such
expensive projects as supplying expensive pharmaceuticals for large groups
of people in developing countries.
119 See Sell 2002 Article #2, supra note 32.
120 Maskus, supra note 5, at 570.
121 id.
122 Id. at 574.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 576.
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E. Orphan Drug Production
Another alternative to public-funded research would be a plan similar
to the current Orphan Drug Program in the United States. 125 The Orphan
Drug Act defines an orphan drug as one that treats a disease affecting less
than 200,000 people in the United States or one that would not be profitable
for other reasons.126 The government thus provides a number of incentives,
including market exclusivity, assistance with new drug applications,
research grants and tax benefits to encourage the production of these
drugs.
12 7
A group of international organizations and governments could form a
world orphan drug program, pooling their resources to provide the same
kinds of incentives as those in the U.S. Orphan Drug Act. When combined
with price discrimination, perhaps among developing countries with
varying levels of income and differing abilities to pay for drugs, this plan
would both ensure the existence of drugs important to the developing world
and the means for inhabitants to afford them.
The combination of a worldwide orphan drug program and price
discrimination within the developing world is an ideal solution to the
problem of access to medicines. The market exclusivity provision would
give companies in the developed world an incentive to research and develop
a drug needed in the developing world. At the same time, companies could
charge higher prices for the drug if they were to find a market for it in the
industrialized world. However, neither can function effectively without the
other-if companies only utilize publicly funded research to provide
incentives to find cures for tropical diseases, the least developed countries
may still not be able to afford these drugs. Similarly, if companies only
engage in price discrimination, they will still have no incentive to produce
those drugs that only affect the developing world. Thus, companies must
be able to engage in price discrimination for the medicines they develop for
tropical diseases with public funding among different countries in the
developing world.
For example, although India and Botswana may both be ravaged by
AIDS, 128 the former can afford to pay more for life-saving pharmaceuticals
than the latter. Drugs developed under the worldwide Orphan Drug
Program will be sold in the developing countries with higher elasticity of
demand. Thus, since India is a wealthier country in terms of per capita
125 See Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360 (aa - ee) (1994).
126 Id
127 Id.
128 The website http://avert.org estimates that in 2001, 38.8% of the population of
Botswana was living with HIV or AIDS. While in India that number is only 0.7%, there
were still nearly 6 million inhabitants living with HIV or AIDS in 2001. See
http://www.avert.org/statindx.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
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income, companies could charge a higher price for drugs there without
having too many residents enter the market. At the same time, the lowest
possible price would be charged in a country like Botswana where most
residents would choose to go without medicine if the cost were
prohibitively high.
The solution above is not perfect. Underfunding among governments
and international organizations will cause the incentives in a worldwide
Orphan Drug Program to be less than what many companies would hope.
At the same time, parallel importation would limit the effectiveness of price
discrimination. Nevertheless, this solution is still superior to the access
program outlined by the Doha Declaration and the Motta modification.
Alternatives such as the one mentioned above will still allow developing
countries to overcome national emergencies while promoting technological
transfer and research incentives for tropical diseases.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of international access to pharmaceuticals is a real and
pressing concern. Residents in countries like Botswana, where nearly forty
percent of the population was living with HIV or AIDS in 2001, are in dire
need of more affordable medications. The TRIPS Agreement seemingly
foreclosed diminished international intellectual property protection as a
means of ensuring drug access except in the most extreme circumstances.
However, both the public health-minded Doha Declaration and Motta
Agreement established compulsory licensing as a temporary access
solution. Forcibly requiring a company to relinquish the patent protection it
had spent millions of dollars in research and development costs to secure,
however, is blatantly contrary to the intellectual property-protecting goals
of TRIPS.
In the future, the WTO ought to avoid plans requiring compulsory
licensing, and especially the newly legalized ability for developing
countries to import medicines made under compulsory license, because they
are both unsustainable solutions and contrary to the object and purpose of
TRIPS. Possible solutions to the drug access problem that do not impinge
upon international intellectual property rights include solutions such as
voluntary price discrimination plans or a world-wide orphan-drug program
funded by the governments of industrialized countries that will both provide
residents in developing countries with the drugs they need and will keep
intellectual control of pharmaceuticals in the hands of their inventors.
Contrary to the assertions of anti-pharmaceutical industry groups, strong
intellectual property protection is the most efficient way to ensure adequate
research and development in the future. The WTO's asserted solution of
compulsory licensing simply will not achieve this goal.
The Spirit of TRIPS
25:257 (2004)
APPENDIX - ARTICLE 31 OF TRIPS
129
Article 31
Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter
of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by
the government or third parties authorized by the government, the following
provisions shall be respected:
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual
merits;
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to.such use, the proposed
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not
been successful within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may
be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial
use. In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as
reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-commercial use, where
the government or contractor, without making a patent search, knows or has
demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or
for the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly;
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose
for which it was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor technology
shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice
determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive;
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive;
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the
enterprise or goodwill which enjoys such use;
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of
the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use;
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate
protection of the legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to be
terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and
are unlikely to recur. The competent authority shall have the authority to
review, upon motivated request, the continued existence of these
circumstances;
the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the
129 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 31.
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circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the
authorization;
(i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of
such use shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a
distinct higher authority in that Member;
(j) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of
such use shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a
distinct higher authority in that Member;
(k) Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in
subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice
determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive.
The need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into account in
determining the amount of remuneration in such cases. Competent
authorities shall have the authority to refuse termination of authorization if
and when the conditions which led to such authorization are likely to recur;
(1) where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent
("the second patent") which cannot be exploited without infringing another
patent ("the first patent"), the following additional conditions shall apply:
(i) the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an
important technical advance of considerable economic significance in
relation to the invention claimed in the first patent;
(ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-license on
reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in the second patent; and
(iii) the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non-
assignable except with the assignment of the second patent.
